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ABSTRACT
Public policy is one of the defenses that a court or a party may invoke in order to
resist enforcement of an unjust foreign award or judgment. The purpose of this
study is to analyze the status of the public policy as a defense to enforcement in
the U.S and to examine its success rate. The thesis will contain suggestions to
make public policy a more meaningful defense with respect to the enforcement of
foreign judgments and its role in bringing about uniformity in the field of foreign
judgments will be analyzed.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The importance of arbitration as a tool in resolving international conflicts cannot
be overstated. It offers various advantages like consistency, fairness, flexibility
and confidentiality that may be lacking in a foreign judicial forum.1 With the
multifold increase in international trade and commerce, often arbitral awards and
foreign judgments from one country will have to be enforced by the courts in
another country. 2 For instance, the defendant’s assets may be located in the
other country. This is a common scenario in international commercial disputes
where the litigants belong to different countries. The effectiveness of an
international award or a foreign judgment in turn depends on its effective
enforcement.3 The losing party may resist an award or judgment against them by
raising various defenses at the enforcement stage, public policy being one such
defense.
This thesis will be an extensive study on the status of the public policy
defense to the enforcement of foreign awards and judgments in the United
States. Attempts will be made to compare the functioning of this defense in both
these contexts. The cases reveal that courts are willing to enforce awards in
1

Susan Choi, Judicial Enforcement of Arbitration Awards under the ICSID and New York
Conventions, 28 N.Y.U. J. Int’L. & Pol.175 (1996).
2
Kenneth-Michael Curtin, Redefining public policy in International Arbitration of National
Mandatory Laws , 64 Def. Couns. J. 271 (1997).

1

2

order to facilitate international commerce although it may result in occasional
injustice to the parties involved. The thesis will contain suggestions to make
public policy a more meaningful defense with respect to the enforcement of
awards and the role of this exception in bringing about uniformity in the field of
foreign judgments will be analyzed.
The study is divided in six main parts. Chapter 1 is the introduction. In
Chapter 2, the meaning of the term public policy is discussed. This chapter will
also describe its scope, applicability and the types, namely domestic and
international public policy.
Chapter 3 analyzes the role of this defense in the enforcement of foreign
arbitration agreements and awards under the New York Convention. After a brief
look into the New York Convention, the standard of public policy followed by U.S.
courts is analyzed. A detailed study of some of the cases where this defense has
been rejected and a case where it was successful is also done. Also discussed in
this chapter is the arbitrability of certain national laws in the field of securities,
antitrust and RICO statues.
Chapter 4 deals with the public policy defense and foreign judgments. It
includes a brief description into the sources of law and the requirements in order
to recognize a foreign judgment. In addition cases where foreign judgments were
found to be consistent with U.S. public policy and vice-versa are illustrated.
Chapter 5 will compare the functioning of the public policy defense in the
context of foreign awards and judgments followed by the conclusion in chapter 6.

3

Ramona Martinez, Recognition and Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards under the
United Nations Convention of 1958: The Refusal Provisions, 24 Int’l Law. 487 (1990).

3

The thesis finally concludes with a brief summary and recommendations for the
continued existence and effectiveness of public policy, as a defense to
enforcement.

CHAPTER 2
MEANING AND TYPES OF PUBLIC POLICY
There is no precise definition for the term public policy. To quote a famous
criticism, Judge Burrough in an old English case stated that, “it is an unruly horse
and once you get astride it, you don’t know where it will carry you”.4 The reason
for its various criticisms being that it lacks consistency, predictability and
uniformity. It generally refers to the grounds on which a receiving court may
vacate an award or judgment that is contrary to the law or standards of the
court’s jurisdiction.5 The standard of public policy varies between countries
because it is interpreted by the legislature and judiciary of each country.
This doctrine has found its way in two major areas of law. It is directly
applicable in the field of contracts and is indirectly applicable in the choice of law
rules. When parties make contractual agreements violating state laws they are
not enforced because it is against that states public policy. 6 Rights and duties
based on illegal contracts such as a gambling contract is a good example. Its
applicability is more complex when parties choose foreign law as the choice of
law under their contract. The question then is whether applying the foreign law

4

Richardson, 130 Eng. Rep. at 303.
Jay R. Server, The relaxation of inarbitrability & public policy checks in U.S. and foreign
arbitration: Arbitration out of control? , 65 Tul. L. Rev. 1661, *1663 (1991).
6
Michael Mousa Karayanni, The Public policy exception to the enforcement of forum selection,
34 Duq. L. Rev. 1009, *1014 (1996).
5

4
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will violate the basic judicial principles of the enforcing state. As a general rule,
penal and revenue judgments of one country are not enforced in another state.7
Public policy is divided into two major types:
Domestic public policy
When arbitration is associated to a particular country, only that country’s
domestic policy will be considered by the enforcing court.8 The court analyzes
whether enforcement would violate the local norms and the well established
principles of that country’s justice and morality. 9 Domestic public policy is
expressed by the laws of that state and its judicial practices. Thus if the court or
the parties involved can raise a strong case that enforcement would violate the
domestic public policy, fraud in the agreement or due process violations for
instance, then enforcement will be denied.
International public policy
When arbitration has an international character and different countries are
involved, the enforcing court should not only consider its own public policy but
also that of interested nations and the needs of international commerce.10 There
is a kind of balancing of interest and depending on the case at hand and the
interests of the involved states a determination is made as to which country’s
policy will prevail. International public policy is generally construed more liberally
than that of its domestic counterpart.11 This is clearly exemplified in the cases of
Scherk and Mitsubishi where the Supreme Court upheld the agreement to
7

Id. at 1015.
See supra note 2 at 280.
9
See id.
10
Id. at 281.
8

6

arbitrate claims under the Securities and Sherman Acts purely on the basis of the
international character involved. The Court balanced the interest of promotion of
international arbitration on one hand and public policy on the other when deciding
on the relevant issues.
Thus most countries specifically distinguish between domestic and
international public policies. U.S. courts are of the view that “international public
policy cannot be equated to that of the domestic one, but needs to be given
supranational emphasis.”12 Also courts are much slower in invoking the public
policy grounds out of “concerns for international comity, respect for foreign law
and tribunals and advancement and smooth functioning of international trade”.13
Some scholars suggest a third classification, namely transnational public
policy. This type is very vague and difficult to apply. General principles of law,
customs and usages of the business community are to be applied without
inquiring if the dispute is related to any particular country or taking into account
the public policy of the interested states.14 Critics argue that this has various
advantages like uniformity and flexibility and that this type comes into play when
arbitration is governed by the principles of lex mercatoria. Transnational public
policy is highly controversial because of the absence of any distinguishing
features from international public policy. The lack of clear guidelines as to what

11
12
13
14

See supra text accompanying note 5.
Parsons, 508 F. 2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974).
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. 614, 636 (1985).
See supra note 8 at 282.
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constitutes transnational principles and its extensive similarities with international
public policy raises questions as to its very existence.15

15

Id.

CHAPTER 3
PUBLIC POLICY DEFENSE & ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN AWARDS
Overview of the New York Convention
In the United States, arbitration is generally governed by the principles of the
Federal Arbitral Association except when it conflicts with the New York
Convention. The New York Convention which is the most important convention in
the field of arbitration “aims to facilitate the recognition and enforcement of
foreign awards between private parties”.16 It has been widely accepted and over
120 countries are parties to the Convention. The scope of the convention is laid
down in Article I. Article II states that member states to the Convention shall
recognize and enforce agreements that contain a subject matter that is capable
of being resolved by arbitration.17 Article III requires contracting states to enforce
foreign awards in a similar manner like those of domestic awards and not to
impose additional fees or conditions. Article IV relates to the procedure involved
in proving the award.
Article V (1) contains a list of general defenses to enforcement. An award
can be set aside if the agreement underlying the arbitration is invalid or if there is
a violation of due process.18 Irregularity in the composition of the arbitral tribunal
and excess of authority by the arbitrator are also grounds for non-enforcement. If

16

Supra note 1 at 187.
Article II of The Convention on the Recognition & Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June
10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
18
Id art V(1)(a).
17

8

9

the arbitrator steps over the limits in terms of authority, that is another ground for
non-enforcement. Finally courts may refuse enforcement if the award is not
binding or has been set aside. Article V (2) contains two additional defenses,
namely the public policy defense and the inarbitrability defense that will be dealt
with in depth in the following pages.
Public Policy Defense and Standard
Art. V 2b states that” recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award
may be refused if the competent authority in the country where enforcement is
sought finds that doing so would be contrary to the public policy of that
country”.19 It is also referred to as the “second look doctrine” because a party
against whom an award has been made gets a second chance to resist it at the
enforcement stage.20 This is what happened in the famous anti trust case of
Mitsubishi v Solar where the Supreme Court projected this line of thought. It is
sometimes referred to as the “safety valve because it is subject to interpretation
by the legislative and judicial process of each nation”.21
A bird’s eye view indicates that this defense would be a major obstacle to
the smooth functioning of international arbitration. A literal interpretation would
have jeopardized the meaningful purpose of the New York Convention. So courts
have followed a practical interpretation and have upheld this defense only when it
would be contrary to the very basic legal principles of the country where
enforcement is sought. The foundation for the public policy principle was laid

19

New York Convention, see id. art. V(2)(b).
see supra note 8 at 274.
21
Heather R. Evans, Note, The Nonarbitrability of Subject Matter Defense to Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards in the U.S. Federal Courts, 21 N.Y.U. J. Int’l. L. & Pol. 329, 334-35 (1989)
20
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down in the famous case of Parsons & Whittmore Overseas Co. v Societe
Generale de l’Industrie du Papier.
This case was one of the early cases to reach the appellate level after the
adoption of the convention. The principle laid down in this case has become the
basis for determining whether public policy of U.S has been violated or not and
has been cited in almost all cases where this defense is raised. The dispute
related to a contract between Parsons, an American company and Rakta, an
Egyptian Corporation over the construction of a paper mill in Egypt. The outbreak
of the Arab Israel Six Days War of 1967 was followed by withdrawal of financial
support by the U.S. Government to the project and subsequent souring of foreign
relations between the two countries.22
Since the U.S. Government withdrew its financial back up, Parsons
invoked the “force majeure” clause of the contract that relieved responsibility if
factors beyond the control of the parties justified non-performance of the
contract. Rakta commenced arbitration proceeding as per the contract and
obtained an award in their favor.23 Efforts by Parsons in trying to nullify the award
by raising the public policy defense failed. The second circuit court refused to
identify U.S foreign policy with public policy and enforced the arbitral award that
the Egyptian company had obtained for breach of contract.24
The principle laid down in this case was that “Enforcement will be denied
only if it violates the forum states most basic notion of morality and justice.”25 The

22
23
24
25

Parsons& Whittemore, 508 F.2d at 972.
Id.
See id. at 969.
Id. at 974.
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court also made a distinction between public policy and national policy and held
that the former should be given a superior effect. A study of other cases will show
that American courts have always rejected this defense because the Parsons
standards were not duly met.
Cases Rejecting the Public Policy Defense.
The public policy defense has been given a very narrow construction by U.S.
courts. Most courts have enforced arbitral awards even if circumstances
compelled otherwise. A look into some of the American cases will cast light on
this extra precautious approach followed by the courts.
1. Fertilizer Corporation of India v. IDI
A brief look into the facts suggests that this should have been an ideal case for
non-enforcement because of the tainted nature of the arbitration. The arbitral
agreement provided for a panel of three arbitrators chosen by parties. One of the
arbitrators selected by FCI, the winning party, had represented them in earlier
arbitrations, a fact that was not disclosed.26 The existence of the former attorneyclient relationship was not revealed and FCI, falsely denied the allegations made
by IDI. The court however denied the motion to reconsider stating that the
irregularity did not measure up to the Parsons standards and enforced the
award.27
One of the most basic principles in any arbitration is that arbitrator should
be neutral and free from the appearance of any bias. This was definitely a blow
to public policy and the courts reasoning was that although disclosure would

26
27

517 F. Supp 948 (S.D. Ohio 1981) at 953.
Id. at 955.
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have been preferable, the rules governing that arbitration did not specifically
require such a revelation.28 A more compelling reason was promoting the smooth
functioning of international arbitration and this could be achieved only by finality
of proceedings.
2. Waterside Ocean Navigation Company v. International Navigation
In this case that involved a dispute between the owner of a shipping vessel and
its charterer, the question of sanctity of oath was in issue. The latter party
challenged enforcement of award claiming that it was based on inconsistent
sworn testimony by the witness. The witness for the International Navigation in a
prior testimony stated that the ship was sub chartered, but in a later testimony
took the stand that the sub charterer in fact was an agent as he did not have a
share in the financial aspects of the vessel.29 His testimony was taken into
account by the arbitrators and a decision was rendered in favor of the charterers.
The court reasoned that the witness did not knowingly perjure himself. Hence the
argument that U.S. policy of protecting the value of testimonial oath was being
violated, did not carry sufficient weight.30
Both the district court and the appellate court rejected the owner’s
argument and refused to equate the policy against inconsistent witness
statement with the basic notions of morality and justice. In the words of the
Second Circuit Court, “the public policy defense must be construed in the light of
the purpose of the Convention and the purpose is to encourage enforcement of

28
29
30

See id.
737 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1984).
Id. at 151.
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foreign arbitral awards”.31Thus even when the integrity of the judicial system was
in question the public policy defense was not effective.
3. Brandeis Intsel Ltd v. Calabrian Chemicals Corporation
This case involved a dispute was between the seller and purchaser of chemicals.
The court confirmed an award that was rendered by the arbitration panel in favor
of the purchaser. The seller’s argument was that there was “manifest disregard of
the law”, since the purchaser and the members of the arbitration panel were all
members of the London Mercantile Exchange.32 The court however rejected this
argument and held that although the facts implicated the public policy defense
there was no mischief involved, and that manifest disregard of the law did not
meet the standards of contravention of public policy. 33
The court also distinguished this case from that of Commonwealth
Coating Corp. v. Continental Gas Co. where the Supreme Court rejected an
arbitration award when a financial relationship was present between one of the
parties and the arbitrator, a fact which the other party had no knowledge of.
However, this kind of commercial relationship was absent here.
With respect to the Calabrian’s argument that the arbitrators had wrongly
applied the British Sale of Goods Act of 1979, the court made a distinction
between enforcement of a void contract and a wrong application of the rules of a
valid contract and stated that the purchaser’s argument fell in the second

31
32
33

Id. at 152.
Brandeis Intsel Ltd. v. Calabrian Chemicals Corp., 656 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
See id. at 165.
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category. 34 Thus the award was confirmed even though there was irregularity in
the application of the law.
4. A case where enforcement should have been denied was that of National Oil
Corp. v. Libyan Sun Oil Co. There was a contract by an American oil company to
conduct oil exploration in Libya. However the American company failed to fulfill
its part of the deal when the foreign policy between U.S. and Libya deteriorated.
The U.S. government barred Americans from traveling to Libya. Arbitration was
subsequently held and $20 million was awarded in damages to the Libyan
company. 35 The American company invoked the public policy defense and tried
to set aside the award. Their main arguments were that enforcement would result
in punishing a company for simply obeying the Government’s foreign policy. 36 It
would also bar other companies from supporting the Government’s sanctions.
Secondly, it would be inconsistent with the U.S. Government’s anti-terrorist policy
and enforcement would result in indirect support to Libya’s pro-terrorist
activities.37
Although the court was aware of the truth involved in National Oil Corp’s
arguments, and that Libya was not a member to the New York Convention, it
refused to equate foreign policy with public policy and held that the Parsons test
was not met in this case and that enforcement would not result in violations of the

34

Andrew M. Campbell, Refusal to Enforce Foreign Arbitration Awards on public policy grounds,
144 A. L. R. Fed. 481 (1998).
35
National Oil Corp., 733 F. Supp at 819.
36
See supra note 34.
37
Id. at 320.
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basic principles of morality and justice. Thus the court went to the extent of
confirming an award in favor of a state that sponsored terrorism.38
5. American Construction v Mechanized Construction of Pakistan. This is a case
where the U.S. court went to the extent of enforcing an arbitration award even
when there was a foreign judgment nullifying the arbitration. This case involved a
contract agreement between the two parties. ACME, the plaintiff began ICC
arbitration against MCP for breach of contract of supply of goods and services.39
Although MCP initially submitted to arbitration it later was of the view that the
arbitration was not valid under Pakistani laws and obtained a Pakistani judgment
to that effect. An arbitration award was rendered in favor of ACME and MCP
raised the public policy defense to enforcement.
The court however as in earlier cases narrowed the application of this
defense and held that the Pakistani judgment was defective in nature because of
certain omissions and misrepresentations and also that MCP had in fact tried to
escape the results of arbitration.40 This case shows that courts have set a
stringent standard for the successful implication of the public policy defense and
existence of a foreign judgment against the arbitration award does not meet this
standard. Thus it should be no surprise to see that this defense has been rarely
successful.

38

Supra note 35 at 820.
American Construction Machinery & Equipment Corp., v. Mechanized Construction of Pakistan,
659 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
40
Joseph T. McLaughlin, Enforcement of Arbitral Awards under the New York Convention,
Practice in U.S. Courts, 477 PLI/Comm 275, *293.
39
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Case Recognizing Public Policy
A detailed study of the U.S. cases shows that there have been only a couple of
instances where this defense has been successful. The case of LaminoirsCableries de Lens, S.A. v Southwire Co. involved a dispute between a French
seller and an American buyer over price and interest rates in a purchase contract
for steel wire.41 The arbitration panel applying the foreign law required
defendants the payment of interest running at the rate of 9.5 and 10.5%. The
argument by the losing party was that enforcement of the award was against the
public policy of the U.S. The court accepted this defense only in part, and refused
to enforce the award which applying the French law imposed an additional rate of
5% per annum if the award was not fully paid within a certain date.42 The court
regarded this additional fee as a penalty as it was a way of punishing someone
for omission of an act instead of compensating for private loss suffered by them
and held that enforcement of this portion of the award would violate the public
policy of U.S.
The court however enforced the other part of the award that imposed
higher interest rates. According to the Georgia law, even though the accepted
rate was about 7%, parties could contract a higher rate, and there was no limit to
the rate that parties could set in writing if the amount exceeded $100,000 or
more.43 Thus the court enforced the award because there were no public policy
violations and it also stated that and stated that, “Americans could not have trade

41
42
43

484 F. Supp. 1063 (N. D. Ga. 1980).
Id. at 1068.
Id. at 1069.
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and commerce exclusively in their own terms, governed by their own laws and
decided by their own courts”.44
.
Due Process Clause
The due process clause can be found in Article V(1)(b) and V(1)(d) of the New
York Convention. As the concepts of due process and public policy exist side by
side, this will also be considered. Art V 1b states that, “Enforcement will be
refused if the party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper
notice of the proceedings or was unable to present his case”.45
In the case of Parsons Whittmore, the due process defense was raised
by the American company. Their argument was that the arbitrators had not
conducted the hearing in the fair manner as one of their witnesses was not
present. They claimed that the witness had a prior commitment and wanted the
hearing to be postponed.46 The court rejected this defense and stated that a
speaking engagement would not justify rescheduling an international
arbitration.47 Thus this defense has also been narrowly construed by courts. U.S.
courts look into the case as a whole and do not refuse enforcement if the
defendant was not given the opportunity to present a portion of his case,
especially if it would not reverse the outcome of the case.
On the other hand, this defense has been successful in certain other
cases. In Iran Aircraft Industries v. Avco Corp., the award was not enforced

44
45
46
47

See id.
New York Convention, supra note 17, art. V (1)(b).
508 F.2d at 975.
See id.
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because defendant was denied the opportunity to present his case in a
meaningful manner. In a pre-hearing conference, the defendant was allowed to
submit audited accounts instead of numerous invoices.48 Later, when the judge
was replaced, the new judge disallowed the accounts and refused to buy the
explanation put forth by the defendant. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit refused to enforce the Iran – U.S. Claims Tribunal award, because the
tribunal had previously agreed to the method in which the defense was to be
presented but later rejected the manner in which it was offered even though it
was duly authorized by the tribunal.49
Thus it can be seen that though strictly construed, this defense has been
relatively more successful than its public policy counterpart and courts have
given effect to the due process defense in truly egregious circumstances.
Art V 1d sates that, “Enforcement may be denied if the composition of the
arbitral authority or the arbitration procedure was not in accordance with the
agreement of the parties or with the law of the country where the arbitration was
held”.50 The main difference between the article V(1) and article V (2) defenses is
that while the latter can be raised by both the court and the parties involved, the
former is raised only by the party against whom the award is invoked. This
defense too, like the V(1)b defense is given effect when enforcement would
result in severe injustice to the parties involved and if the basic principles of
justice are violated.
Al Haddad Bros. v M/S Agapi
48
49

980 F.2d 141, *144 (2d Cir. 1992).
See supra note 16 at 208.

19

The arbitration agreement between the parties provided for the arbitrators to be
selected by each of the parties and if consensus was not be reached by the
arbitrators, they were to select a third arbitrator.51 The nominee so elected was to
decide the dispute. The decision in this case was in fact made by a single
arbitrator. Al Haddad objected to the award pleading that there was violation of
the due process clause as the award was not made in accordance with the
agreement.
The court refused to accept this defense. Its reasoning was that the
Convention recognized awards that were made in compliance with the laws of
the state where the case was decided. According to the English laws, an award
rendered by a single arbitrator was valid and hence it was enforced.52 The court
also stated that the defect could not be considered fatal to the outcome of the
award and the defense was thus rejected.53
Courts have given narrow construction and violation of domestic notions
of due process does not mean that a foreign award will not be enforced. Thus
due process exception applies only to those cases in which serious abnormalities
in proceedings exist.54
Imperial Ethiopian Government v. Baruch-Foster Corp.
In this case, the agreement provided that the arbitrator should not have had any
connections with the parties involved, direct or otherwise. Baruch Foster, the
losing party discovered that the arbitrator had connections to the Ethiopian
50
51
52
53

New York Convention, supra note 17, art.V(1)(d).
Al Haddad, 635 F. Supp. At 209.
Id. at 210.
See id.
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government because he had previously drafted the Civil Code for the Ethiopian
Government.55 He alleged that there was violation of due process as the
selection process for the arbitrator was not consistent with the agreement. The
District court rejected this defense and stated that Baruch Foster waived any
objections to the selection of the arbitration panel.56 Baruch appealed the
decision of the District Court. The Court of Appeals was also of the same view
that the losing party’s allegations did not carry sufficient weight and confirmed the
decision of the District Court.
Article V(1)(a) can also be argued to be part of the due process defense.
Enforcement can be denied if the parties can prove that they lacked the capacity
to consent or if the agreement was void under the applicable law.57 The consent
given by the parties can be the focus of the dispute, or there may be fraud or
duress involved.
Question of Arbitrability
The defenses of public policy and non arbitrable subject matter are often
intertwined by courts and as non arbitrable subject matter forms part of the
general concept of public policy, article V(2)a is also discussed.
Article V(2)a states that enforcement may also be refused by courts if the subject
matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law
of that country. 58

54
55
56
57
58

See supra note 16 at 211.
th
535 F.2d 334, *335 (5 Cir. 1976).
Id. at 336.
New York Convention, supra note 17, art. V(1)(a).
Id., art.V(2)(a).
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It should be noted that the above condition is also stated in article II(1) of
the convention which compels courts of contracting states to recognize an
arbitration agreement that concerns a subject matter capable of settlement by
arbitration.59
Thus a party challenging the arbitrability of the dispute can raise this
defense before the commencement of arbitration or at the award enforcement
stage. The dividing line being thin, the question of arbitrability with respect to
enforcement of awards and agreements are considered together.
Arbitration in the field of Securities law.
The U.S. securities law that can be found in the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were designed to protect investors from
unscrupulous security dealers and to help them in making informed investment
decisions.60 The first case that addressed the issue of arbitrability of securities
law was that of Wilko v Swan. The case involved allegations by the Petitioner of
misrepresentations by the brokerage firm that had sold some stocks to the
Petitioner.61 When damages were asked for under section 12(2) of the Securities
Act, the respondent’s arguments were that arbitration had to be conducted as per
the agreement.62 The court rejected the arbitration policy as invalid and held that
as a matter of public policy, securities law were inarbitrable.

59

see id., art II(1).
Darrell Hall, No Way Out: An argument against permitting parties to opt out of U.S. securities
laws in international transactions, 97 Colum L. Rev. 57, *59 (1997).
61
Wilko, 346 U.S. at 428-29.
62
See id. at 429-30.
60
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The Supreme Court has since then reversed its original position and has
allowed arbitration of the traditionally inarbitrable 1933, 1934 Securities Act and
Sherman Acts.
Scherk v Alberto Culver
The case involved a forum selection clause of an agreement that provided for
arbitration before the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris.63 The choice
of law was that of the laws of the state of Illinois. The dispute was over certain
trademarks that were sold by a German seller to an American manufacturer. The
allegations by the American buyer were that they were misrepresented and
fraudulently sold to him and an action was started in the district court to rescind
the contract.64 It was argued that there was a violation of section 10(b) of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and hence the arbitration clause was
unenforceable. Scherk, the German seller tried to dismiss the suit and proceed
with arbitration. Reversing the decisions of the District Court, the VII Circuit Court
of Appeals and also that of its earlier precedents, the U.S. Supreme Court
allowed arbitration of the 1933, 1934 Securities Acts.65
The court in the Alberto Culver’s case rendered a land mark decision that
paved the way for arbitration of national laws. It distinguished this particular case
from that of the Wilko due to the international nature of the agreement and
secondly because there would be no clarity as to the applicable law in this case
in the absence of a prior agreement.66 Also giving effect to the agreement was
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indispensable in order to achieve certainty in the field of international
arbitration.67 The court stated that failure to give effect to the arbitration clause
would result in the parties frustrating their original intent and would be abused as
a tool in following delay-tactics that would ultimately result in destroying the very
purpose of international arbitration.68
The court proceeded to remark that if any injustice had resulted in the
course of arbitration the victimized party had always the remedy against
enforcement by raising the public policy defense under the Convention. Thus the
Supreme Court took the initial step in allowing national laws to fall under the
purview of arbitration. This was a fatal mistake as only the national courts should
exercise that power and court systems should not have abdicated this primary
function to the wishes of the individual parties as to who should decide on
national laws. A review of this case indicates that court had based its decision
purely on the international nature of the arbitration involved and similar facts, in a
domestic context would have produced a different result.
Two later cases that were decided in the 1980’s expanded the application
of the Alberto doctrine to domestic securities disputes. In the case of
Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, the claim was that a brokerage firm
violated section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5.69 The district court
held that arbitration could be allowed, but the appellate court followed the Wilko
doctrine. The Supreme Court decided in the context of the “federal policy
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favoring arbitration”.70 It relied on the decision in the Mitsubishi case and held
that arbitral tribunals, like judicial forums were well qualified and capable of
deciding legal complexities and issues of the national laws even in the absence
of judicial supervision.71
Thus the expansion of arbitration subjected the investors at a very high
risk, depriving them of the protection offered to them under the securities laws.
The parties could easily escape the reach of the national laws by turning to
arbitration and if abused, this will only lead to the fall of arbitration.

Arbitration and Antitrust
The Sherman Act has been described as the Magna Carta of Free Enterprise as
antitrust laws protect economic freedom and the laissez faire system.72 The
purpose of the Act was to maintain unrestricted interaction of competition which
is vital for economic growth and consumer protection. Due to this, American
courts had long regarded antitrust laws as inarbitrable, because the nature of
claim involves serious scrutiny and supervision that may be lacking in an arbitral
forum. The case of American Safety Equipment v. J.P.McGuire embodied this
doctrine. The Second Circuit Court after weighing various factors, rejected
arbitration of a domestic licensing agreement that involved antitrust issues.73 But
with the increase in international trade and the trend favoring arbitration this was
also reversed.
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Mitsubishi v Soler
Although the case dealt with the enforcement of an arbitral agreement, article
V(2)b played a part in the decision. Soler entered into a distributorship
agreement with Chrysler International S.A, to sell Plymouth cars in an area in
Puerto Rico. Later a sales agreement was entered into by Soler, CISA and
Mitsubishi Motor Corp. that contained a clause for resolving any future disputes
by arbitration under Japan Commercial Arbitration Association.74 The business
venture functioned smoothly but later a dispute arose between Soler and
Mitsubishi when the former was unable to satisfy its part of the bargain.75 The
question in issue was whether arbitration could be held in Japan as per the
agreement despite Soler’s allegations that anti trust claims under U.S. laws were
to be decided only by courts.
The district court’s ruling in favor of arbitration was reversed by the circuit
court which applied the American safety doctrine. The Supreme Court enforced
the agreement and the arbitration clause. It held that the American safety
doctrine was inapplicable in this context as the dispute arose from an
international context. The reasons listed were concerns for international comity,
respect for capacity of foreign tribunal and the need for certainty in the resolution
of disputes.76
Also the court had in the earlier cases of Bremen and Scherk, decided
that contracts made freely indicating choice of forum clauses were to be
enforced, as this would be consistent with the intent of the New York
74
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Convention.77 Appearance of an antitrust dispute and assumption that the arbitral
panel lacked competence were not sufficient to nullify a freely negotiated
agreement between the parties.78 As Japan also possessed a body of highly
developed antitrust laws, and as the arbitrators were well qualified, arbitration
was to go forward as U.S. courts always had the power to refuse enforcement if
the antitrust issues were not properly decided by the panel.79 The public policy
defense was to come into the picture at that stage.
The dissent by Justice Stevens was very strong. He correctly stated that,
“vague concerns over comity were not to outweigh public policy”.80 He
distinguished this case from Scherk as this case did not involve foreign laws and
was totally under the realm of U.S. antitrust laws.81 He rightly pointed out that
Congress did not authorize the transfer of decision-making authority of statutory
claims from courts to that of arbitrators.82 He stated that under the New York
Convention, “agreements requiring arbitration of disputes that were non
arbitrable under domestic law were not to be honored”.83
This case is a clear example of how the Supreme Court sacrificed public
policy in the name of international comity. It made certain assumptions that treble
damages would be awarded by arbitral forums, parity of the effectiveness of
arbitration to litigation, even though arbitrators are not required to state their
76
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reasons in arriving at the award.84 The majority failed to give proper construction
to the articles of the New York Convention and stressed the importance of the
public policy defense although a study of the cases indicates that it is rarely
successful.
Arbitration and RICO statutes
The Mitsubishi rationale has been extended by lower courts to another important
arena of national laws namely the RICO statutes. The Racketeer Influence and
Corrupt Organization statute allows the successful party to claim treble damages
and litigation expenses in civil suits. The RICO statues have not made provisions
for arbitration for such civil actions. In the case of Jacobson v. Merrill Lynch, the
third circuit court held that claims under RICO were inarbitrable as jurisdiction
was obtained by violating section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.85
However in the case of Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,
the Supreme Court held that claims under section 10(b) of Securities Act of 1934
and RICO must be arbitrated according to the arbitration agreement.86 As there
was no specific legislation mandating non-enforcement of arbitration agreements
arising under RICO suits, the court decided that the agreement to be valid.87
The Mitsubishi rationale has been extended by lower courts to another important
arena of national laws namely the RICO statutes. The Racketeer Influence and
Corrupt Organization statute allows the successful party to claim treble damages
and litigation expenses in civil suits. The RICO statues have not made provisions
83
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for arbitration for such civil actions. In the case of Jacobson v. Merrill Lynch, the
third circuit court held that claims under RICO were inarbitrable as jurisdiction
was obtained by violating section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.88
However in the case of Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,
the Supreme Court held that claims under section 10(b) of Securities Act of 1934
and RICO must be arbitrated according to the arbitration agreement.89 As there
was no specific legislation mandating non-enforcement of arbitration agreements
arising under RICO suits, the court decided that the agreement to be valid.90

Conclusion
Most countries have recognized the advantages of arbitration in international
trade and have attributed parity to that of litigation. Although this is to be
welcomed, a careful look reveals that freedom if unchecked leads to abuse.
Courts are extremely hesitant to use the defenses that are provided under the
New York Convention. For instance, the public policy defense is interpreted so
narrowly that it has become a ground for vacation in theory only.
Article V 2 b was intended to be a safeguard against unfair awards.
However the pattern of monotonous rejection followed by U.S courts because of
the failure to meet the Parson standard, sometimes leads to unjust results to the
parties.91 The Parsons standards in turn is very vague and in the last thirty years
the success rate of the public policy defense is negligent, thus indicating that
87
88
89
90

See id.
797 F.2d 1197 at 1199 (3d Cir. 1986).
107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987).
See id.

29

better guidelines are required interpreting the “basic notions of morality and
justice” standard.
The reluctance in erecting barriers initially could be understood as
arbitration was in its early days of birth and required a lot of nurturing. But now
that arbitration as an institution has been firmly established, it is now up to the
courts to oversee its proper functioning in order to ensure its perpetual
existence. The public policy exception should be made a more meaningful
defense and this in turn will uphold the integrity of arbitration and ensure its longterm survival.
The inarbitrability defense under article V(2)a, is another valuable tool
given to courts and the parties under the NYC. Its original intent was to remove
form the ambit of arbitration certain public issues of a significant nature, that only
adjudication by national courts would be appropriate.92 For example, as
discussed above, security, antitrust, RICO and other national laws are to be
decided by courts. The main reason being, arbitrators resolve dispute between
the parties but the court system goes a step further and are responsible for
upholding the integrity of national laws.
The Supreme Court’s position with respect to the arbitrability of certain
federal Acts should be viewed with extreme caution because disputes relating to
certain federal statutes are best left to national courts.93 At the rate at which
arbitration has been spreading steadily into all matters, it will come as no
surprise one day if almost every international dispute can be arbitrated. Courts
91
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should oversee the smooth functioning of arbitration without erecting too many
hurdles but at the same time should not sacrifice its own public policies.94
Otherwise parties may use arbitration as a tool to avoid laws that are of national
importance which in turn will shake the foundation of this neutral and fair
institution.95
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CHAPTER 4
PUBLIC POLICY DEFENSE & ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgements in General
This section deals with the public policy defense and the enforcement of foreign
country judgments. Within the U.S, the “full faith and credit clause applies to
sister state judgments”.96 This means that judgments from other states are
recognized and enforced in the same manner as that of judgments made within
the state. Foreign judgments on the other hand are not accorded the same
standing that is given to sister state judgments.97 Also, unlike in the field of
arbitration, there are no international treaties and there is also the lack of federal
legislation. Thus most of it has been left to the individual states and common law
plays a predominant role.98
When a foreign judgment is sought enforcement in the court, the
procedure is that the court will have to analyze and decide whether it can be
recognized and enforced. Although in common parlance, these two terms are
interchangeably used, there is a vital distinction between the two.99 Recognition
always precedes enforcement. Recognition means that the U.S. court after a
detailed study of the case at hand is of the view that the matter in dispute has
been thoroughly decided by the foreign court and that it does not require further
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litigation.100 Enforcement means that a court will deliver the relief or the judgment
of the foreign court.101 Another feature to be noted is that although recognition is
essential for enforcement, it is does not always ensure enforcement. For
instance, a plaintiff may require only recognition in order to dismiss a suit that
has been instituted in another court. In most cases, once recognition is received,
the foreign judgment is given the same status as that of sister state judgments.102
There is a lack of uniformity in U.S courts regarding the enforcement but the
modern trend is that foreign judgment is conclusive if all the necessary requisites
are met.
Sources of Law
In most cases involving the enforcement of a foreign judgment, state law is
applied. However the Supreme Court has not specifically decided on this issue. A
brief look into the sources of law will shed light on the applicability of the
governing law.
1. Federal common law.
Although the Erie Railroad v Tompkins case removed the applicability of federal
common law in diversity cases, the common law principle has been adopted by
most states.103 The principle is embodied in the early case of Hilton v Guyot. The
liquidator of a firm residing in France brought a suit against Hilton and Libbey,
residents of New York to enforce a French judgment that allowed recovery of a
99
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certain sum of money. 104 The federal Court held the foreign judgment to be valid
but the Supreme Court reversed the decision. Justice Gray in his often quoted
decision held that “Enforcement of foreign judgment is not based on statute,
treaty or the constitution but on the basis of comity.”105 “Comity is neither a
matter of absolute obligation nor mere courtesy and good will. It is the
recognition which one nation accords to the judicial processes of another nation,
having due regard …… to the rights of its own citizens who are under the
protection of its laws.”106
This decision placed much emphasis on the reciprocity agreement
between nations, and the lack of it resulted in the reversal. Although this rule of
reciprocity has not been followed by most states, the doctrine of comity laid down
in this case has come to play an important role in the courts decisions.
2. Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act
The common law modified by the Recognition Act that has been adopted by half
of the U.S states.107 This act was proposed by National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State laws 30 years ago. It lays down the grounds for
non-recognition of a foreign judgment. It not only applies to money judgments but
is applicable to other judgments as well.
3. Restatement (third) of foreign relations law.
Like the Recognition Act, the purpose of the Re-statement was to codify the
common law and to increase the likelihood that U.S judgments will be recognized
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abroad in states with reciprocity requirements.108 There a couple of minor
differences between the two namely, lack of subject matter jurisdiction mandatory
ground for non - recognition under the act while only discretionary ground under
the re-statement. Secondly, the act has forum non conveniens, a discretionary
ground for non recognition.109
Requirements for Recognition
The principles laid down in the Hilton case that were later codified in the
Act and the Restatement lists certain requirements that are to be satisfied if a
foreign judgment is to be recognized. The factors considered by courts are as
follows:
1. Jurisdiction is an essential element. The foreign court delivering the judgment
must have had “jurisdiction over the cause” in order to be recognized by U.S.
courts.110 The standard applied is similar to that of sister state judgments and the
“minimum contacts” test is the key in deciding this issue.111 When the defendant
consents to the foreign court’s jurisdiction, the question is whether it was direct or
indirect. Voluntary appearance by the defendant for other than the purpose of
contesting jurisdiction is considered as giving consent.112
2. The foreign judgment needs to be final and conclusive. In order to enforce a
foreign judgment the court should be satisfied that the dispute was conclusively
settled by the foreign court.113 If the decision can be appealed, it does not mean
108
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that the foreign judgment will not be enforced. The defendant can show that the
he intends to appeal or that one is pending, and the court has the option of
staying the case until the resolution of the appeal.114
3. A court may refuse enforcement of a foreign judgment if the judgment was
defective because of fraud. Generally if the fraud is intrinsic, that is if it was
related to an issue that could have been disputed, a foreign judgment is
enforced.115 However if it is extrinsic in nature, then recognition is denied. The
standard to be met by the defendant is by “clear and convincing evidence”.116
4. Due process and foreign judgments.
A foreign judgment is refused recognition if the basic principles of due process
are not met. The court looks into whether the parties were given proper notice
and opportunity to present their case in a meaningful manner.117 Differences
between U.S. courts and foreign courts will not result in non-recognition. The
foreign court procedures cannot be expected to be similar but needs to be
compatible to those of U.S. due process requirements
Thus U.S. courts have enforced foreign judgments even when there was
a lack of jury trial, pre-trial discovery procedures, absence of cross examinations
and oral examinations. When enforcing a foreign judgment, the court analyzes
the gravity of the due process violation and examines whether if not for the
violation a different decision would have been forthcoming.
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The court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, held that a notice to the
defendant in Hebrew language, would constitute proper notice.118 The defendant
doing business in Israel for many years alleged that he did not understand the
Hebrew language. The court was of the opinion that since the defendant was
aware of the fact the documents served were legal in nature, ignoring it was his
fault and found no due process violations.119
However in the case of Bank of Iran v. Pahlavi, a default judgment
obtained by the bank against the sister of the former Shah of Iran was refused
recognition by the California court.120 The political conditions in Iran made her
entry into that country at high risk and as she did not have the opportunity to
contest that case, it was not enforced. Due process also requires the foreign
tribunal to be fair and impartial.121 Courts normally do not judge the judicial
system of other countries and mere allegations of due process violations are not
entertained by U.S. courts unless they have a solid basis. In one case, the
federal court refused non-enforcement of an East German judgment as those
courts “did not speak as an independent judiciary”.122
5. Public policy exemption to the enforcement of foreign judgments.
The Court in Hilton v Guyot held that foreign judgment would not be
recognized if doing so contravenes the public policy of United States.123
Although, this defense may be raised whenever there is a difference in the
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procedure, or if the result of the foreign court varies from that of the enforcing
court, in practice the effectiveness of this defense is extremely restrictive. Under
the Act, recognition is refused if the judgment is repugnant to the public policy of
the state.124 Although no clear definition has been forthcoming, a certain
standard has been followed in deciding whether public policy has been violated.
Standard of Public Policy
The principle laid down in the case of Somportex Ltd. V Philadelphia Chewing
Gum Corp. forms the basis for setting public policy standards and has been cited
very often. The case involved an agreement by which the plaintiff was to
distribute the defendant’s goods in U.K.125 When the agreement did not
materialize, the plaintiff sued for breach of contract, obtained a default judgment
and sought enforcement in the U.S. courts.126 In addition to jurisdiction issues,
the defendant contested that awarding of attorney fees and compensation of loss
of good will was against the public policy of Pennsylvania but the district court for
the eastern district of Pennsylvania held the damages awarded to be valid.127
The court took the view that “recognition will be refused only if it injures
public health, morals, confidence in the purity of administration of law or
undermines the sense of security for individual rights which any citizen ought to
feel”.128 Thus a foreign judgment will normally be enforced unless it is contrary to
the notions of justice and fairness.
Foreign Judgments consistent with U.S public policy.
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As there is no clear definition to the term public policy, it has been invoked as a
defense to the recognition of foreign judgment in numerous cases. It should
however be noted that courts have construed this defense narrowly and it has
not been very successful.
In the case of Tahan v Hodgson, the defendant tried to block recognition
of an Israeli default judgment. He alleged that enforcement would violate the
public policy and the due process principles of U.S.129 The District Court decided
in his favor holding that failure to issue the second notice violated the due
process principles and also made the defendant liable for the actions of the
corporation, stating that the public policy against “piercing the corporate had
been violated”.130 The district court’s decision was reversed by the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia. The court was of the opinion that “mere
differences in procedure would not justify non-recognition” and that the alleged
due process violation was not contrary to the basic notions of fairness and
decency. 131
The court also stated that as Israel had similar corporate laws, the
defendant could not claim the public policy defense especially when he had been
given the notice and opportunity to contest for a similar decision that could be
obtained in a U.S. court, but failed to appear.132 The fact that the defendant had
defaulted played a role in the court’s decision. It can be seen that even when
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contested, simple allegations of policy violations are insufficient. The party should
be able to prove that a different result would be derived in a U.S. court.
Ingersoll Milling Machine Co. v Granger
This case involved a dispute over freedom of employment contract. A
Belgian court applying Belgian law awarded termination benefits to the
defendant. The plaintiff brought a suit in the U.S. state court seeking a
declaratory judgment that it was not liable to pay. 133 The defendant (Granger)
had the case switched to district court and sought enforcement.134 The plaintiff’s
main argument was that there was a violation of public policy because the
Belgian Court applied their law instead of the law of Illinois as indicated in the
contract.135 The Illinois law favored freedom of contract and this would have been
conducive to the plaintiff. However the district court found no violation and held
that it was proper for the Belgian court to use their law as in similar
circumstances a U.S. court would have done the same.136
To sum up, U.S. courts have enforced foreign judgments even when
based on actions or procedures that are absent or vary under U.S. law.137 For
example, courts have enforced foreign judgments for loss of good will, default
judgments, repayment of gambling debts and attorney fees. In the case of
Intercontinental Hotels Corp. (Puerto Rico) v. Golden, the New York Court of
Appeals rejected the defendant’s claim that recovery of gambling debts violated
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the states public policy. 138 Although gambling agreements were illegal in New
York, the court was of the opinion that, “the New York public does not consider
authorized gambling a violation of ….. deep rooted traditions”.139
Thus courts have accorded recognition to foreign judgments in a very
liberal manner. If all the abovementioned requisites are fulfilled, and if there is no
grave violation of the basic policy and judicial principles, foreign judgments are
generally enforced.
Judgments Contrary to Public Policy.
U.S courts do not recognize foreign penal and revenue judgments. A Philippines
judgment was denied enforcement because the Govt. of Philippines imposed
sanctions that were intended “to deter future actions and to promote public good
instead of compensating the plaintiff”.140 Foreign judgments are generally refused
recognition when important public issue policies are at stake. In cases in which
public policy violations are found, societal interests rather than merely protecting
litigant’s interests play a decisive role.141 The public policy exception has been
successfully invoked to refuse enforcement of foreign libel judgments especially
when it is contrary to the U.S. constitution.
1. Bachchan v India abroad publications
This case involved a publication of an article in a Swedish newspaper about the
Bofors scandal in which some friends of the late Indian Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv
Gandhi were accused of receiving funds from a Swedish arms dealer who tried to
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make an arms deal with the Indian Government.142 The plaintiff brought a suit
against India Abroad publications for having published this story in both the U.S.
and U.K. editions. The jury awarded damages and recovery of attorney fees
which the plaintiff tried to enforce in U.S.143
The defendant argued that there was a violation of the public policy as
enforcement would jeopardize the protections offered by the First Amendment of
the Constitution.144 The court after detailed analysis refused enforcement as
British libel laws offered lesser protection and there existed fundamental
differences between U.S. and British libel laws.145 Under the former, it did not
matter if malice was a part of the defamation while under the latter, negligence
and fault had to be proved. As the British libel laws did not afford this protection,
enforcement would have resulted in curtailing the freedom of the press. Thus
when the enforcement of a foreign judgment violated the public policy, nonrecognition is considered as “constitutionally mandatory”.146
2. Ackermann v Levine
In this case, the defendant was involved with real estate dealings in New
York and tried to get financial support from certain German investors.147 In the
course of the dealings with the investors, he sought the services of the plaintiff, a
German attorney. The fee payment was never discussed but at the end of the
negotiations, the plaintiff charged a sum of money for his services according to
142
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the rate as set down in the German statute.148 A default judgment was obtained
in favor of the plaintiff in Germany and he tried to enforce in the New York Court.
The district court refused enforcement because it was contrary to the public
policy of the state. New York law requires disclosure of the billing procedure to
the client and as this was lacking in this case, enforcement was denied.149
The court of appeals unlike the district court struck down only a portion of
the German default judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff. It was of the
reasoning that there existed a public policy violation in one aspect.150 State law
required evidence of prior authorization and work being actually performed by the
counsel.151 The judgment included fee for a particular study claimed to have
been done by the counsel. As there was no proof that such a study was
requested and performed, enforcement was denied because the state had a
greater interest in not enforcing unconscionable attorney fees.152
The court was of the opinion that enforcement would make American
citizens involved in international transactions vulnerable in their dealing with
foreign attorneys. The court weighed the importance of international legal
relations on one hand and enforcing foreign judgments on the other and voted in
favor of the former.153 Thus it can be clearly seen that when important public
policies are at issue, courts have refused enforcement of foreign judgments.
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Conclusion
A study of the cases reveal that U.S. courts have been liberally enforcing foreign
judgments and that the public policy defense has been given a narrow
construction by courts. However when there is a conflict of interest between
enforcement of a foreign judgment and fundamental state policy, this defense
has played an important role in non-enforcement. This defense has been pivotal
in non-recognition of a defective judgment especially when enforcement would
undermine well-established legal and national policies.
At the national level, one matter that requires serious consideration is the
lack of uniformity in U.S courts as to under what circumstances a foreign
judgment will be enforced.154 This is because enforcement is left to individual
state and this in turn depends on whether the state has adopted the Recognition
Act or left to the states common law. One approach as Prof. Brand suggests
would be the adoption of the Recognition Act by all the states or the enactment of
federal legislation in this field preempting state legislations.155
Moreover, unlike in the field of arbitration, there are no treaties at the
international level to which U.S is a party that would facilitate the enforcement of
foreign judgments. The needs of international trade and commerce require one
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such multilateral convention and combined efforts have to be made to redress
this situation.156

156

Id. at 326.

CHAPTER 5
COMPARISON OF THE FUNCTIONING OF THE PUBLIC POLICY DEFENSE
The above study shows that both foreign awards and judgments are liberally
enforced by U.S. courts. With respect to the functioning of the public policy
defense, courts narrowly interpret this defense and refuse enforcement only if it
violates principles of morality and justice.157 Generally speaking, the defense has
been successful only when fundamental interests of the enforcing state are
violated.
Although the existence of this defense has been criticized by many as
being detrimental to the free flow of foreign awards and judgments beyond a
country’s borders, it can be clearly seen that this criticism suffers from lack of any
basis and the fact is that the public policy defense is rarely successful.158
However, when a making a comparison, it is to be noted that this defense
is used much more meaningfully in the context of foreign judgments than in the
enforcement of foreign awards. Enforcement was denied on many occasions
based on public policy grounds. Especially in cases where vital national policies
are at stake, courts have taken a favorable attitude towards this defense. The
Bachchan case is a good example where enforcement of a libel judgment was
denied when the rights under the first amendment were violated. In the
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Ackerman case, the public policy defense was successful as the state had a
greater interest in not enforcing unconscionable attorney fees.159
The situation in the field of arbitration is different and though often
invoked there are only a couple of cases where this defense has been successful
and a French award was partially denied enforcement. In most of the cases, this
defense has been very ineffective and courts have allowed arbitration of national
laws thereby even violating fundamental state interest.
The decision of the D.C. Court of Appeals in the case of Laker v. Sabena
in affirming the lower courts holding of granting anti suit injunction against the
defendants is of much relevance here.160 In that case which involved antitrust
issues, the court specifically held that, “the forum had a greater interest in seeing
that important public policies are not evaded”.161 As the defendants were trying to
escape application of antitrust laws to their conduct of business in the U.S., the
injunction was upheld.162 Thus the reliance that issues on national laws will be
properly decided by the arbitrators may backfire as the only goal of arbitrators is
to amicably settle the dispute between parties. This calls for a meaningful
application of the public policy defense in the enforcement of certain arbitration
awards.
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CHAPTER 6
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
It is very evident that with regards to enforcement of foreign arbitral agreements
and awards, courts and the legislature have been removing all roadblocks in
favor of complete arbitral freedom.163 However absolute and unchecked power
may have serious consequences in the long run. The New York Convention has
provided for legal barriers like the public policy defense, to prevent the
enforcement of unjust awards by the receiving country. But the U.S. courts are
following the Parsons standards of morality and justice, an old precedent being
subjected to the strictest of interpretations. It is very doubtful if any case would
satisfy this high level of scrutiny.
An ideal solution would be for the legislature to lay down the structure
and standard of public policy so that courts can effectively use this defense
against unfair results. The present standard is unclear as to how much opposed
to law, an award should be in order to being struck down. Hence an initiative by
the legislature in setting the standard followed by uniform interpretation by the
courts would effectively re-instate public policy, a meaningful defense in the
enforcement of foreign awards.
Also to be noted is that when enforcing domestic awards, the standard of
public policy defense is less strict and in many cases it is possible to satisfy
those standards. In a case decided by the Fifth Circuit it was held that when
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enforcement compels violation of law or conduct contrary to accepted policy,
such circumstances necessitated non-enforcement.164 This line of reasoning was
followed in numerous domestic awards. Courts have thus taken a different stand
when deciding foreign and domestic awards and this is well exemplified by
looking into two similar cases with different outcomes.165 A foreign award was
upheld even though a Pakistani judgment declaring the arbitration clause and
proceeding to be void existed.166 On the other hand, even though similar public
policy arguments were raised, a domestic award was vacated and the court
highlighted the need to respect the judicial processes of other countries.167 A
dual standard was followed and contrasting results were also arrived at when the
partiality of the arbitrator was in issue in domestic and foreign contexts.
The issue is why courts continue to follow the double standard and
whether it leads to unfair results. The courts willingness to recognize the public
policy defense in case of domestic rather than foreign awards is very unclear.168
Justice demands fairness to the parties and should not be based on the domestic
or foreign nature of the arbitration. A solution worth looking into will be to follow
the standard of domestic arbitral jurisprudence in all cases, namely a deferential
stance towards arbitration but a case by case analysis of facts in order to prevent

163

See note 5 at 1688.
th
416 F.2d 198, *201 (5 Cir. 1969).
165
Eloise Henderson Bouzari, The Public policy exception to the enforcement of international
arbitral awards: Implications for Post Nafta jurisprudence, 30 Tex. Int’l L.J. 205, *214 (1995).
166
See note 38.
167
Sea Dragon, Inc. v. Gebr. Van Weelde Scheepvaart Kantoor B.V., 574 F.Supp. 367 (S.D.N.Y.
1983).
168
Supra note 163 at 217.
164

49

unjust results.169 A middle path of protecting freedom of contract and state
interest should be followed.
Since arbitration has been accorded an equal, if not greater status to that
of the court system in the settlement of international commercial disputes, it is
vital that there exists a limited amount of judicial review of awards.170 This is
necessary to prevent defective awards and for the healthy survival of this
institution.171 As Professor Park rightly points out, “there is no reason … that the
neutrality of procedure and forum offered by arbitration cannot co-exist with
limited court review of awards”.172
With regard to enforcement of foreign judgments:
Although foreign country judgments have generally been recognized and
enforced in the U.S, non - recognition of U.S judgments abroad is the rule rather
than the exception. Adoption of a multilateral convention for the enforcement of
foreign judgments is the only remedy to this situation.173 The success of the New
York Convention and the diminishing differences between litigation and
arbitration indicates that this task may not be all that impossible.
Inclusion of the public policy defense will encourage any such efforts by
the international community because a state may use it as a “safety valve” and
refuse to enforce judgments that are contrary to its laws.174 Its role as a
mechanism in defining and protecting state sovereignty should be highlighted
169
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and this in turn would encourage reluctant countries in joining the Convention.
The only requisite is that this defense calls for a meaningfully interpretation and
not a broad one. Part II of the 19 th Session of the Hague Conference on Private
International Law which is scheduled to meet in the course of the year 2002, to
analyze and hold successful negotiations for implementation of this project
should consider the use public policy defense as an important tool in their
negotiations in bringing about uniformity in this field.
To quote Prof. Behr, “in the short term, this defense is indispensable. In
the long run, it is sensible to preserve an ultimate safeguard against unforeseen
differences between domestic and foreign laws”.175
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